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NOTES AND COMMENT
NEW YORK OF EVIDENCE ALLUDING TO THE FACT
THAT THE DEFENDANT IS INSURED.

ADMISSIBILITY IN

L

General Rule of Exclusion.

As a general rule, evidence in a negligence action that the defendant is insured against liability is inadmissible.' This is in accord
with the fundamental exclusionary rule of the law of evidence that
matters which are for the most part irrelevant and which tend to unduly prejudice the defendant are not admissible. 2 Such evidence is
irrelevant since the fact that the defendant is insured can give rise to
no legitimate inference that he was negligent on the occasion in question; it is prejudicial for it tends to influence the jury by imparting
to them information that the verdict to be rendered by them, whatever the amount may be, will be immaterial to the defendant, since
it will not be paid by him, but by the insurance company. 3 The rule
is not limited to positive evidence that the defendant carries insurance,
but applies to any reference, whatever form it may take, implying that
the defendant is insured against liability. 4 Thus, it has been held that
questions put to a witness inquiring whether the defendant is insured, 5
arguments, comments, or statements made by counsel on summation
or otherwise, 6 or comments made by the trial judge on the fact of in' Cosselmon v. Dunfee, 172 N. Y. 507, 65 N. E. 494 (1902); Simpson v.
Foundation Co., 201 N. Y. 479, 95 N. E. 10 (1911) ; Akin v. Lee, 206 N. Y. 20,
99 N. E. 85 (1912); Rodzborski v. American Sugar Refining Co., 210 N. Y.
262, 104 N. E. 616 (1914) ; Notes (1928) 56 A. L. R. 1418; (1935) 95 A. L. R.
388; (1936) 105 A. L. R. 1319.
2 O'TooLE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1937)
197.
3 Akin v. Lee, 206 N. Y. 20, 99 N. E. 85 (1912) ("Such evidence, almost
always, is quite unnecessary to plaintiff's case and its effect cannot but be highly
dangerous to the defendant's; for it conveys the insidious suggestion to the
jurors that the amount of their verdict for the plaintiff is immaterial to the
defendant. It was a highly improper attempt on the plaintiff's part to inject a
foreign element of fact into his case which might affect the jurors' minds, if in
doubts upon the merits, by the consideration that the judgment would be paid
by an insurance company") ; see note 1, supra.
4 Hordern v. Salvation Army, 124 App. Div. 674, 109 N. Y. Supp. 131 (1st
Dept. 1908) (It is improper to suggest "by way of argument or by way of
questions to the jury, or in any other way, that the defendant was protected by
insurance").
Cosselmon v. Dunfee, 172 N. Y. 507, 65 N. E. 494 (1902) ("Do you
know whether they carry insurance for accident to their employees?"); Manigold v. Black River Traction Co., 81 App. Div. 381, 80 N. Y. Supp. 861 (4th
Dept. 1903) ("Didn't Dr. Rockwell go there to try and settle with Manigold
[the plaintiff] and wasn't he representing the insurance company back of this
company?"); Frahm v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 131 App. Div. 747, 116 N. Y. Supp.
90 (1st Dept. 1909) ("How soon did you communicate with your attorneys in
regard to this accident or the Casualty Company of American?").
6 Loughlin v. Brassil, 187 N. Y. 128, 79 N. E. 854 (1907) (Plaintiff's coun319
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surance, 7 are improper. The New York Court of Appeals has said: 8
"Evidence that the defendant in an action for negligence was insured
in a casualty company, or that the defense was conducted by an insurance company, is incompetent and so dangerous as to require a
reversal even when the court strikes it from the record and directs
the jury to disregard it, unless it clearly appears that it could not have
influenced the verdict."
The admission of such evidence, therefore, where an objection
thereto is made and overruled, 9 or where the objection is sustained
but no instruction is given to the july to disregard the matter, is
ground for a reversal of judgment. 10 But even if the court sustains
the objection and instructs the jury to disregard the matter, a new
trial may still be ordered if it appears that the substantial harm which
resulted could not be cured by the subsequent instructions to disregard it."
Thus, where the violation of the rule is wilfull, it would
seem that a new trial should be ordered as a matter of course.' 2 The
sel in summing up said: "There is no evidence that he [the defendant] was
insured, most of these people are" and "many people get insured, but there is no
evidence of apy such thing in this case at all." This was held reversible error) ;
Haigh v. Edelmeyer & M. Hod Elevator Co., 123 App. Div. 376, 107 N. Y.
Supp. 936 (1st Dept. 1908) ; Ritacco v. City of New Rochelle, 180 App. Div.
559, 168 N. Y. Supp. 190 (2d'Dept. 1917) (In an action against the city for a
fall on an icy sidewalk, plaintiff's counsel on summation said: "You don't
imagine for a moment the city is going to pay; you know well enough who is
going to pay." A new trial was granted) ; Kent v. Lajotee, 103 Misc. 486, 170
N. Y. Supp. 545 (1918).
7 Branoner v. Traitel Marble Co., 144 App. Div. 569, 129 N. Y. Supp. 761
(1st Dept. 1911); Lipschultz v. Ross, 84 N. Y. Supp. 632 (1903).
8 Simpson v. Foundation Co., 201 N. Y. 479, 95 N. E. 10 (1911).
9Haigh v. Edelmeyer & M. Hod Elevator Co., 123 App. Div. 376, 107
N. Y. Supp. 936 (1st Dept. 1908); Donnelly v. Younglove Lumber Co., 140
App. Div. 846, 125 N. Y. Supp. 689 (3d Dept. 1910); O'Brien v. Hencken &
W. Co., 172 App. Div. 142, 158 N. Y. Supp. 200 (1st Dept. 1916); Dietz v."
Dinkel, 230 App. Div. 699, 246 N. Y. Supp. 623 (3d Dept. 1930) ; Stringer v.
Guggenheim, 117 N. Y. Supp. 978 (1909); Horan v. Altman, 176 N. Y. Supp.
433 (1919).
10 Frahm v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 131 App. Div. 747, 116 N. Y. Supp. 90 (1st
Dept. 1909).
11 Cosselmon v. Dunfee, 172 N. Y. 507, 65 N. E. 494 (1902) ; Simpson v.
Foundation Co., 201 N. Y. 479, 95 N. E. 10 (1911) ; Akin v. Lee, 206 N. Y. 20,
99 N. E. 85 (1912); Rodzborski v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 210 N. Y. 20,
99 N. E. 85 (1914); Manigold v. Black River Traction Co., 81 App. Div. 381,
80 N. Y. Supp. 861 (4th Dept. 1903); Hordern v. Salvation Army, 124 App.
Div. 674, 109 N. Y. Supp. 131 (1st Dept. 1908); Rothenburg v. Collins, 161
App. Div. 387, 146 N. Y. Supp. 762 (3d Dept. 1914). But see Adler v. Lesser,
110 N. Y. Supp. 196 (1908).
12 Frahm v. Siegel-Cooper Co., 131 App. Div. 747, 116 N. Y. Supp. 90
(1st Dept. 1909) ("The references to the Casualty Company were highly
improper and, as is shown by the repetition thereof, were deliberate, and not
the result of ignorance or inadvertence, and we cannot say, in the light of the
evidence, that the verdicts may not have been induced thereby. Upon this
ground alone, therefore, the judgments must be reversed"); Cunningham v.
Heideberger, 48 Misc. 614, 95 N. Y. Supp. 528 (1905) ("The question asked by
plaintiff's counsel in the course of his examination of jurors: 'Do you know
Mr. Frank V. Johnson, attorney for the Fidelity Insurance Company in this
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asking of a question which counsel must be assumed to know is improper has been well termed "highly reprehensible", 13 so that where
it appears that it was deliberate, the court should not speculate as to
whether the jury did in fact disregard it, but should reverse the judgment. As was said in Hordern v. Salvation Army: 14 "As counsel
in cases of this kind have been so often admonished as to the impropriety of suggesting either by way of argument or by way of questions
to the jury, or in any other way, that the defendant was protected by
insurance, it seems to be unnecessary to say more than that such a
suggestion in the presence of the jury will render any verdict that
has been obtained by the plaintiff valueless, as a violation of the rule
will require a reversal of the judgment. * * * Counsel has been so
often admonished that such practice will not be tolerated, that where
it appears from the record that the rule has been violated we think
there should follow as a penalty a reversal of the judgment and the
direction of a new trial." The ultimate test, however, would seem to
be whether or not the jury might have been influenced by the evidence, in spite of the fact that it was subsequently stricken out.15 In
this connection, it would appear that the burden of showing that the
evidence had no prejudicial effect on the jury is on the plaintiff.' 6 The
courts are so solicitous of the defendant's rights in this matter, that
even where the reference to insurance is voluntarily brought out by a
case', was most prejudicial in character, and the objectionable matter having
been introduced in such a way as to negative any legitimate purpose a new trial
should be had in the interests of substantial justice").
'1

Cosselmon v. Dunfee, 172 N. Y. 507, 65 N. E. 494 (1902)

("We affirm

this judgment without opinion,-but feel constrained to refer to an occurrence on
the trial that has become too frequent in negligence cases. Counsel for plaintiff
asked a witness for defendants this question: 'Do you know whether they carry
insurance for accident to their employees?' This question was objected to as
incompetent and objection sustained. While the learned trial judge made a
proper disposition of the matter, nevertheless, the propounding of the question
was calculated to convey an improper impression to the jury. The inquiry into
the matter of insurance is not material and the practice of asking a question
that counsel must be assumed to know cannot be answered is highly reprehensible, and where the trial court or Appellate Division is satisfied that the verdict
of the jury has been influenced thereby it should, for that reason, set aside the
verdict").
14 124 App. Div. 674, 109 N. Y. Supp. 131 (1st Dept. 1908).
15Akin v. Lee, 216 N. Y. 20, 99 N. E. 85 (1912) ("While frequently in
the exercise of the authority conferred upon this court, we disregard technical
errors, when we see that they do not affect the merits of the controversy, the
error committed in this case is of too repeated instances, judgments have been
reversed for its commission and counsel must take notice that we shall adhere
to our rule and that we shall order a new trial in all cases, where, in such
actions, a verdict may have been influenced by the consideration of such
unauthorized evidence") ; see note 11, supra.
Where there is a close question of fact, the judgment probably will be
reversed. Simpson v. Foundation Co., 201 N. Y. 262, 104 N. E. 616 (1911) ;
Levy v. J. L. Mort Iron Works, 143 App. Div. 7, 127 N. Y. Supp. 506 (1st
Dept. 1911).
16 Manigold v. Black River Traction Co., 81 App. Div. 381, 80 N. Y. Supp.
861 (4th Dept. 1903).
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witness in an unresponsive answer which could not be anticipated by
counsel, a new trial will be ordered. 1 7 "If the answers were unexpected, as claimed, it was the duty of the plaintiff's counsel himself to
move to strike oui the evidence and to ask the court to instruct the
jury to disregard it. * * * A prompt withdrawal of the evidence by
the counsel for the plaintiff would go farther toward correcting the
evil than any motion made by the attorney for the defendant." 18 But
where the examining counsel does promptly move to strike out the
evidence and the court instructs the jury to disregard it (assuming,
of course, that it clearly appears that the answer was unexpected), it
would seem that he has done all that is within his power to cure the
error, and the judgment should be allowed to stand.' 9 To hold otherwise would be to sanction a rule that would permit an irresponsible
witness to destroy the plaintiff's case, no matter how strong it might
be. 20 In any case, however, if it clearly appears that the jury was in
fact not influenced by the improper reference to insurance, the judgment will not be reversed, for it would then21be a mere technical error
not affecting the merits of the controversy.
17 Pritz v. Carnot, 179 N. Y. Supp. 164 (1919) (Plaintiff's counsel while
cross-examining the defendant, asked him what he had paid for repairs to his
automobile, to which the defendant unexpectedly answered: "The insurance
company took care of that." Though no motion was made to strike out the
evidence, a new trial was granted). Cf. Chernick v. Independent American
I. C. Co., 66 Misc. 177, 121 N. Y. Supp. 352 (1910) (Defendant's president was
asked on cross-examination: "When you got these papers, what did you do with
them, the summons and complaint?" Defendant's counsel objected, but the
witness was allowed to answer: "I sent it to the company because I am insured
for that." It was held that defendant's motion for the withdrawal of a juror
should have been granted).
Is Rodzborski v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 210 N. Y. 262, 104 N. E. 616
(1914). In commenting upon this case, the court in O'Brien v. Hencken & W.
Co., 172 App. Div. 142, 158 N. Y. Supp. 200 (1st Dept. 1916), said: "In the
case cited the question of plaintiff's counsel conveyed no hint of any insurance
company indemnifying defendant, and the statement that an employer's liability
company was insuring the defendant came from the witness in the course of a
lengthy answer in response to a question as to what directions he was given by
defendant. Still the Court of Appeals felt called upon to reverse the judgment
upon that ground (as well as another) as it did not clearly appear that the
error was harmless."
19
20 Goodman v. Guida, 150 Misc. 677, 269 N. Y. Supp. 811 (1934).
Note (1928) 56 A. L. R. 1418, 1517.
21 Hager v. Bushman, 255 App. Div. 934, 8 N. Y. S. (2d) 725 (4th Dept.
1939) ; Anderson v. Standard Plunger Elevator Co., 113 N. Y. Supp. 593 (1908).
It has also been held that where reference to the fact of insurance is first
brought out by defendant's own counsel, subsequent reference to it by plaintiff's
counsel cannot occasion such serious injury to the defendant so as to require a
new trial. Lanti v. William F. Kenny Co., Inc., 225 App. Div. 129, 232 N. Y.
Supp. 103 (2d Dept. 1928), aff'd, 250 N. Y. 621, 166 N. E. 347 (1929) ; McTague
v. Dowst, 51 App. Div. 206, 64 N. Y. Supp. 949 (2d Dept. 1900) ("The defendant refers to the fact that the jury awarded the full amount of the damages
demanded in the complaint, and contends that 'The continual injection into the
case of the fact that the defendant was insured in an accident insurance company may in some measure account for this fact.' But the fact of insurance in
a casualty company was first brought to light on the counsel's own cross-
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II.

When Admissible.

It is not to be assumed, however, that evidence that a defendant
in a negligence action is insured is inadmissible in all cases, for although this is the general rule, it is, like most other rules, subject to
various exceptions. Accordingly, where the fact that the defendant is
insured is relevant in that it tends to prove some material issue in the
case, such evidence is admissible, and the mere fact that it may also
tend to prejudice the defendant in that the jury may infer that he will
not have to pay the judgment, is not ground for its exclusion.2 2 This
is in accord with the general rule of evidence that evidence which is
competent upon one issue is admissible, "even though it is not admissible to prove another issue and is prejudicial upon such latter
issue." 23 Thus, where the action is predicated on the doctrine of

respondeat superior, and the defendant denies that he was in fact the
master, it is held that evidence that he carries insurance for injuries
examination of Dr. Webster, who testified that the defendant or someone in his
office, in answer to a message to him over the telephone, informing the defendant of the injury to the plaintiff, said he was insured and that the matter did
not interest him much. After this fact was brought out by the defendant,
subsequent references to it by the plaintiff could not have occasioned any
serious injury to the defendant"). Cf. Rodzborski v. American Sugar Ref. Co.,
210 N. Y. 262, 104 N. E. 616 (1914) ("The error here is sought to be defended
on the ground that it could not have influenced the verdict. The main reliance
in this respect is that in the cross-examination of this same witness, prior to
the evidence complained of, the defendant's counsel drew answers from him to
the effect that upon sone other occasion and it connection with another accident
the witness had dealt with an instrance-company. [Italics ours.] Whether
these answers led the jury here to assume that the defendant was insured is of
course purely conjectural. If the jury had any suspicions of that fact, we
cannot say that the evidence may not have suggested the result. In some cases
it is true the courts have sustained judgments where such evidence has been
elicited. A perusal of them will show that there was reason to believe that the
evidence could not have influenced the verdict. In this case the plaintiff's case
against the defendant depended upon his own interested version, which barely
measured up to the requisite degree of proof, and was contradicted in every
material particular by defendant's witnesses. When we consider these circumstances in connection with the bald reference to the insurance company made
by the witness, we cannot say that the error was harmless").
22 Whitman v. Carver, 337 Mo. 1247, 88 S. W. (2d) 885 (1935) ("There
are instances when it is proper to prove that a defendant has liability insurance
but such a case only arises when such evidence is relevant and material to some
issue involved") ; Note (1928) 56 A. L. R. 1418, 1432. But see Culp v. Repper,
78 F. (2d) 221 (1935), holding that only in extreme cases where it becomes
necessary to establish some decisive issue will evidence relating to the defendant's insurance be admitted. Cf. Hodern v. Salvation Army, 124 App. Div.
674, 109 N. Y. Supp. 131 (1st Dept. 1908) (question as to insurance carried by
the defendant was excluded although "the avowed purpose of asking the question here was to meet the objection that the defendant was a charitable corporation and that its funds should not be diverted from charitable uses in paying
an amount due to the plaintiff because of his injuries").
23 Boten v. Sheffield Ice Co., 180 Mo. App. 96, 166 S. W. 883 (1914).
Cf.
Bennett v. Nazzaro, 144 Misc. 450, 258 N. Y. Supp. 829 (1932) (defendant's
registration application for his automobile was received in evidence though the
reverse side indicated that the defendant was insured).
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to the alleged servant is admissible, for it has some relevant bearing
on the fact of whether or not he was the master. 24 Again, where the
defendant denies that he was the owner of the instrumentality which
caused the injury, evidence that the defendant had procured a liability
insurance policy on that particular instrumentality is admissible, since
it tends to show that he was in fact the owner. 25 Furthermore, evidence of insurance may even be relevant, and therefore admissible, on
the very issue of negligence. While it is true that the mere fact that
one is insured against liability should give rise to no inference that
he would be likely to exercise less care under the circumstances than
if he were not insured, 26 yet when by his own words he discloses that
such in fact is his attitude, such evidence undoubtedly becomes competent on the question of negligence. 27 Thus, where the defendant
makes statements disclosing a reckless attitude based on the fact that
he is insured against liability, evidence of such insurance is held to
be admissible on the question of negligence. In a New Hampshire
case 28 it appeared that the plaintiff, while riding with the defendant
in his automobile, requested the defendant to be more careful, whereupon the defendant answered: "Don't worry, I carry insurance."
The court held, and properly so, that the evidence was admissible,
saying: "His attitude as disclosed by his words imply that he would
be likely to exercise a less degree of care in operating his automobile
for the reason that an insurance company would be called upon to pay
for any damages occasioned to others by his negligence and reckless
conduct."
Again, it has been held that where the defendant has made an
admission of liability wherein he also discloses the fact that he is insured, the plaintiff is entitled to have the admission as a whole come
into evidence. 29 Thus, in Flieg v. Levy, 0 plaintiff brought an action
24 1 JONEs, EVIDENCE (4th ed. 1938) 282, nn.14, 15.
25

Sibley v. Nason, 196 Mass. 125, 81 N. E. 887 (1907) ; Note (1928)

56

A. L. R. 1418, 1435. See Flieg v. Levy, 148 App. Div. 781, 133 N. Y. Supp.
249 (2d Dept. 1912), aff'd without opinion, 208 N. Y. 564, 101 N. E. 1102
(1913), cited infra note 30. Cf. Akin v. Lee, 206 N. Y. 20, 99 N. E. 85 (1912)
(where evidence that the defendant was insured was held not competent on the
grounds that it tended to prove ownership of an automobile, where the defendant's ownership of the car was admitted).
26 Walters v. Appalachian Power Co., 75 W. Va. 676, 84 S. E. 617 (1915).
27 Sims v. Martin, 33 Ga. App. 486, 126 S. E. 872 (1925).
28 Herschensohn v. Weisman, 80 N. H. 557, 119 Atl. 705 (1923).
29 Note (1928) 56 A. L. R. 1418, 1448.
M148 App. Div. 781, 133 N. Y. Supp. 249 (2d Dept. 1912), aff'd without
opinion, 208 N. Y. 564, 101 N. E. 1102 (1913). Cf. Tincknel v. Ketcham, 78
Misc. 419, 139 N. Y. Supp. 620 (1912) (Defendant on cross-examination was
asked: "Didn't you tell me that you would have to refer to your insurance
company?" not for the purpose of showing insurance protection, but to establish
that, when defendant waGs charged with causing plaintiff's injuries he failed to
deny that charge, thereby tacitly admitting his connection with the accident.
This was held reversible error, the court saying: "But for its involving this
question of insurance, defendant's failure to deny the charge laid against him
would have been competent; it was not, however, conclusive, being simply one
of many facts which the jury might consider. It would seem that where two
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for personal injuries received when he was kicked by a horse allegedly
owned by defendant. The defendant denied ownership of the horse,
and plaintiff, in order to establish such ownership, called a witness
who testified as to a conversation she had with defendant as follows:
"He [the defendant] said to me his horse is insured and I should
take a physician and the child will be cured, and I shall be paid for
it." Plaintiff's counsel then asked: "Did Mr. Levy [the defendant]
say anything about the horse ?" The witness replied: "That is what
he said, 'My horse is insured.'" This was held not to be error, the
court saying: "It was incumbent upon the plaintiff to establish the
appellant's ownership of the horse. * * * The question called for
proper and competent testimony, to wit, appellant's admission that the
horse was his, and was material. It was a statement made by the
appellant to the mother of the injured boy, and the fact that in the
admission of ownership the appellant also said the horse was insured,
does not deprive the plaintiff of the right to the conversation." 31
rules so conflict and offered testimony necessarily involves matter which is
specifically prohibited, its otherwise competency must' give way; the positive
harm flowing to defendant therefrom overbalances the probative advantage to
plaintiff of an admission based solely upon failure to deny").
3 It has also been held that where the plaintiff was subjected to crossexamination with reference to a statement made by him, he is entitled to give all
the circumstances surrounding its making, notwithstanding that it is shown to
have been procured by the insurance company insuring the defendant. Shane
v. National Biscuit Co., 102 App. Div. 188, 92 N. Y. Supp. 37 (4th Dept.
1905), aff'd without opinion, 186-N. Y. 514, 72 N. E. 112 (1906) (In an action
to recover damages for personal injuries sustained by plaintiff due to defendant's
negligence, plaintiff testified that a few days after the accident he was called
upon by an attorney, who according to the plaintiff, told him that he had been
sent by the plaintiff's employer in regard to the insurance, and that he wanted
to get a statement from plaintiff. Plaintiff was then asked, over objection and
exception by defendant, a number of questions with reference to the statement
as to the insurance. This was held not to be error, the court saying: "The
intimation was not that the insurance company was defendant, but that the
employer of the plaintiff desired a statement with reference to the insurance. It
is well known that employers are in the habit of carrying employer's liability
insurance, or insurance against injury to their employees through their negligence, and the statement of the plaintiff was to the effect that it was on behalf
of his employers that the statement was desired, not for the defendant, nor for
an insurance company connected in any way with the defendant; and the plaintiff having been questioned with reference to the statement and the manner of
obtaining it, was entitled to give the circumstances at the time the statement
was procured. If the statement was not to the advantage of the defendant the
plaintiff was in nowise to blame, and so long as the testimony was proper, the
fact that it was injurious to the defendant was not a sufficient ground for its
exclusion. There was no claim or intimation that an insurance company was
behind the defendant, but the entire incident is covered by the statement that
the plaintiff understood that the person applying to him represented his employer
with reference to insurance in which it was interested. Whether this was true
or not does not affect the competency of the proof, but it was received as a part
of the transaction with feference to the statement, and we can see no error in
the reception of the testimony").
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a. To Affect Witnesses' Credibility.
The general rule that questions alluding to the fact that the defendant in a negligence action carries insurance is further subject to
the right of the plaintiff to cross-examine witnesses to show their bias
and interest, and this right is not to be denied because as an incident
thereto matters which are irrelevant and prejudicial to the main issue
are elicited.32 As was said in Grant v. National Railway Spring
Co.: 33

"Suppose an insurance company is interested in the action

and a witness is sworn by the defense and gives important evidence,
and he is a stockholder in the insurance company, may not these facts
be shown on cross-examination as bearing upon the credibility of the
witness, and can such evidence be excluded because of any ulterior motives of counsel to disclose the fact that the insurance company is interested in the case? Clearly not. No court has ever held any such
doctrine." Thus, the credibility of a witness may be attacked and his
bias and interest shown by establishing on cross-examination that he
is connected with the insurance company that has insured the defendant, and this in spite of the fact that the jury is indirectly informed
that the defendant is insured and will therefore not have to pay.3 4
Accordingly, a physician testifying in behalf of a defendant may be
impeached by showing that he is in the employ of the insurance company insuring the defendant.3 5 Counsel, however, will not be permit32 DiTommaso v. Syracuse University, 172 App. Div. 34, 158 N. Y. Supp.
175 (4th Dept. 1916), aff'd, 218 N. Y. 640, 112 N. E. 1072 (1916); Grant v.
National R. Spring Co., 100 App. Div. 234, 91 N. Y. Supp. 805 (4th Dept.
1905) ; Wood v. New York State Electric & Gas Corp., 257 App. Div. 172, 12
N. Y. S. (2d) 947 (3d Dept. 1939) ("Also plaintiff's counsel very properly
showed the interests of the investigator for the defendant's insurance company
when such investigator was offered as a witness by the defendant").
33 100 App. Div. 234, 91 N. Y. Supp. 805 (4th Dept. 1905).
34 See note 32, supra.
35 DiTommaso v. Syracuse University, 172 App. Div. 34, 158 N. Y. Supp.
175 (4th Dept. 1916), aff'd, 218 N. Y. 640, 112 N. E. 1072 (1916) (Physician
who examined the defendant was asked in whose interest he made the examination and replied: "The insurance company." This was held proper, the court
saying: "While I think the learned trial judge was entirely justified in concluding that plaintiff's counsel expected the answer which he elicited to his question,
and that it was deliberate purpose to have the fact appear that the doctor made
the examination in the interest of the insurance company, I am of the opinion
that the question was proper. While the courts have quite uniformly frowned
upon the practice of getting before the jury the fact that an insurance company
is defending the action, where that is done for the purpose of prejudicing the
jury * * * [yet] the inquiry here was proper, as I think, to show the bias or
interest of the witness. * * * We do not intend to hold that if a jury is prejudiced by such an inquiry the verdict may not be set aside, even though the inquiry
may have been proper, or even that a trial may not be interrupted and a juror
withdrawn and retrial be- had where it is apparent during the progress of the
trial that the jury has become or will be prejudiced." Merrell, J., concurring,
said: "The questions were entirely proper. In weighing his testimony the jury
was entitled to know whether the witness was entirely disinterested or whether
he was a paid employee of some one vitally interested in the result of the trial.
Such information clearly would be of inestimable benefit in aiding the jury in
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ted in the guise of attacking a witness's credibility, to introduce the
irrelevant fact of insurance for the purpose of prejudicing the defendant.30 Extreme caution should be taken, therefore, in framing a
proper question which may be asked a witness in order to determine
his bias, and yet which will not, if answered
in the negative, leave an
37
innuendo that the defendant is insured.
determining the credibility of the witness and the weight to be given his testimony. It is of secondary importance that the replies to the questions asked
might unexpectedly disclose facts prejudicial to the defendant's rights. Any
resulting prejudice might easily be taken care of by a watchful court in its
charge, or by way of instruction to the jury at the time the prejudicial matter
appeared. In a case beyond the control of the court, any verdict resultant from
such prejudice could and would be set aside"). Cf. Toombs v. Texas Oil Co.,
260 N. Y. Supp. 773 (1932), where the witness was asked who asked him to
come. He replied: "A gentleman from the U. S. Casualty." This was held
improper and a new trial was granted. It is to be noted, however, that the
question asked by counsel had no effect on the witness' credibility, for merely
asking one to come is not improper, unless, in addition thereto, some fee was
paid to him.
3
6 Levy v. J. L. Mott Iron Works, 143 App. Div. 7, 127 N. Y. Supp. 506 (1st
Dept. 1911); O'Brien v. Hencken & W. Co., 172 App. Div. 142, 158 N. Y. Supp.
200 (lst Dept. 1916); Pearlman v. I. Blyn & Sons, 155 App. Div. 888, 139
N. Y. Supp. 1082 (lst Dept. 1913). Cf. Shaier v. Broadway Improvement Co.,
22 App. Div. 102, 47 N. Y. Supp. 815 (lst Dept. 1897), aff'd without opinion,
162 N. Y. 641, 57 N. E. 1124 (1900), where the rule was violated, but the court
found no prejudicial effect. In that case an expert, who was appointed by the
court to examine the plaintiff before trial, had testified upon cross-examination
that he expected to be paid for his services, and he was asked whether he was
to be paid by defendant or by an insurance company. The question was objected
to and plaintiff's counsel consented to withdraw it. The court then instructed
counsel not to say anything more about insurance. Counsel, however, subsequently asked the witness whether or not he had been retained by the lawyers
of the Casualty and Fidelity Company in the case. The witness answered that
he had not heard of the company in the case. The court instructed the jury
to disregard the question. This was held not reversible error, the court saying:
"It certainly, was not error to ask him by whom he was to be paid; and while
the counsel had no right to disregard the instruction of the court and refer to
the insurance company after the court had directed him not to, the mere fact
that he asked a question of a witness as to who was to compensate him for his
expert testimony, whether it was the defendant or some other person, was certainly not such legal error as would justify us in reversing the judgment or
justify the court in allowing a juror to be withdrawn. The court did all that
it was bound to do to protect the defendant. The jury were instructed not to
regard it, and the witness swore positively that he knew nothing of the insurance company. There was no statement made to the jury that as a fact this
insurance company had anything to do with the case, nor does it appear that
this statement did as a fact influence the jury."
37 Thus, the question "Did you tell somebody out in the corridor a couple
of days ago you had been promised a job with the Aetna Insurance Company
if you testified here?", Levy v. J. L. Mott Iron Works, 143 App. Div. 7, 127
N. Y. Supp. 506 (lst Dept. 1911), "You are the physician for the insuring
company in this case?", O'Brien v. Hencken & W. Co., 172 App. Div. 142, 158
N. Y. Supp. 200 (1st Dept. 1916), "Are you connected with the insurance
company in this case?", Pearlman v. I. Blyn & Sons, 155 App. Div. 888, 139
N. Y. Supp. 1082 (1st Dept. 1913), if answered in the negative would be irreleyant and prejudicial and grounds for a mistrial, while if answered in the
affirmative would be admissible as affecting the credibility of the witness. As
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b. On "Voir Dire" Examination of Jurors.
Section 452 of the Civil Practice Act 38 permits the interrogation
of jurors on their voir dire examination in a negligence action with
respect to their connection with insurance companies. That section
provides:
"The fact that a juror is in the employ of a party to the
action; or, if a party to the action is a corporation, that he is
an employee thereof or a shareholder or a stockholder therein;
or in actions for damages for injuries to person or property,
that he is a shareholder, stockholder, director, officer or employee, or in any manner interested, in any insurance company
issuing policies for protection against liability for damages for
injury to persons or property, shall constitute a good ground
for a challenge to the favor as to such juror."
The theory behind the statute was stated in Grant v. National
"This kind of insurance against
loss by employers, by reason of injuries to their employees has become very general. Innumerable companies and corporations are engaged in this kind of business, and it is not a rare thing for such an
insurance company to be interested in negligence actions. Its stockholders and employees, therefore, would be objectionable as jurors to
plaintiffs in such actions. May not inquiry be made in any case
whether any of the jurors are stockholders or employees of such insurance companies? Is not such an inquiry perfectly proper, competent and material? It cannot be doubted." Thus, the general rule
that evidence of defendant's insurance in a negligence action is inadmissible, does not prohibit the interrogation of jurors in respect to
their connection with insurance companies. 40 The only difficulty that

Railway Spring Co.,39 as follows:

was said in Levy v. J. L. Mott Iron Works, suzpra: "It would have been proper
to have asked the witness, if counsel had information warranting it, whether he
had been promised anything for testifying, and, if he denied it, it would have
been proper to direct his attention to a particular admission claimed to have
been made by him, but there is nothing in the-record accounting for these
questions except on the theory of getting it before the jury that the action was
being defended by an accident insurance company." Therefore, if counsel has
no positive information as to whether or not the witness is connected with the
insurance company, the best procedure would be to inquire "Who paid you to
make the examination?" or words of similar import wherein "insurance company" is omitted. In such case, if the witness answers "No one did" then there
can be no ground for a mistrial since the defendant has not been prejudiced,
there being no reference to any insurance company. But if the witness answers
"The insurance company", then the questioning is proper since it has a legitimate bearing on the witness' credibility.
38 This was derived from N. Y. CODE CIrV. PROC. § 1180, last sentence, as
amended by N. Y. Laws 1877, c. 243, N. Y. Laws 1901, c. 243, N. Y. Laws
1911, c. 206.
39 100 App. Div. 234, 91 N. Y. Supp. 805 (4th Dept. 1905).
4o Grant v. National R. Spring Co., 100 App. Div. 234, 91 N. Y. Supp. 805
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arises hereunder is whether or not counsel is limited to general questions inquiring into their interest in "any" insurance company, or
whether he may also interrogate the jurors as to their interest in a
"specific" insurance company. In this connection, we must bear in
mind that the statute does not change the general rule that evidence
41
relating to the fact that the defendant is insured is inadmissible.
Therefore, interrogations of jurors with respect to their interests in
insurance companies, whether the questions are general or specific
in form, which leave an inference that the defendant is insured, are
improper. 42 It would seem, therefore, that questions referring to
(4th Dept. 1905) ; Blair v. McCormack Constr. Co., 123 App. Div. 30, 107 N. Y.
Supp. 750 (2d Dept. 1907); Rinklin v. Acker, 125 App. Div. 244, 109 N. Y.
Supp. 125 (2d Dept. 1908); O'Dell v. Genesee Constr. Co., 145 App. Div. 125,
129 N. Y. Supp. 122 (4th Dept. 1911). In Grant v. National Spring Co.,
upra, plaintiff's counsel, when selecting the jury, asked: "Are any of the
jurymen interested as agents or stockholders in any insurance company insuring
corporations against liability for negligence ?" This was held proper, the court
saying: \"The inquiry was not made as to any company interested in this case
but to any and all such insurance companies. If there was no such insurance
company in the case, it could do no harm certainly. If some insurance company
was interested in the case, then there was good reason why the plaintiff's
counsel should inquire and be certain that no juror interested in that particular
insurance company or any other like company was on the jury. It may be
claimed that counsel often make these inquiries when they have no reason to
suppose there are any persons among the jurors interested in these insurance
companies. The answer is they do not know, and inquire for information. It
is not safe to assume in these times that men summoned upon petit jurors may
not be interested as stockholders in any companies that are likely to make money
and pay good dividends. Men do not disclose to the public where their money
is invested. The only safe way is to ask if they have such interests. The
questions are proper and competent and the court may not exclude answers to
such inquiries or charge counsel with bad faith or improper motives in making

the inquiries. If the questions are proper, it is not important what the motives
of counsel may be; only 'where the questions are clearly incompetent and
immaterial can bad faith be alleged and the counsel and his client be punished
therefor. In this case the question was clearly competent and proper and,
therefore, regardless of the motives of counsel, the answer should have been

received."
41 O'Brien v. Hencken & W. Co., 172 App. Div. 142, 158 N. Y. Supp. 200
(1st Dept. 1916) ("It is quite true that some of these cases were decided before
the amendment to section 1180 of the Code of Civil Procedure [now N. Y. Civ.
Prac. Act § 425] * * * But this is a general proposition, the only effect of which
is to ascertain if talesmen are interested in any casualty company and to make
their interest a ground for challenge, presumably because such interest might
bias them against any recovery in an accident case, whether defendant was
insured or not. It does not give the right to otherwise suggest or state directly
that the defendant in a particular case is insured against loss by reason of
accidents caused by him") ; Galotti v. Deansboro Supply Co., 248 App. Div. 20,
289 N. Y. Supp. 535 (3d Dept. 1936).
42 Rothenberg v. Collins, 161 App. Div. 387, 146 N. Y. Supp. 762 (3d Dept.
1914) (Plaintiff's counsel in examining the jury asked: "I ask the jury to tell
us if any of them are shareholders, stockholders, directors, officers, employees,
or in any way interested in any insurance company issuing policies for protection against liability for damages for injury to person or property?" Defendant
objected to the question and the court inquired of counsel if the action was one in
negligence, and was informed that it was a quasi-negligence action-malpractice.
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specific insurance companies should be excluded for the natural inference to be drawn therefrom would be that the defendant is insured
The court then said: "If it is a malpractice action, you ought to ask them if
they were stockholders or interested in any company insuring against malpractice." Counsel replied: "I tried to ask them in accordance with the statute." The court responded: "Of course that section is intended to apply to
cases where there is a practice of insuring against liability for negligence. I
have never heard of any practice that any company exists anywhere that insures
a doctor against the results of his malpractice." Plaintiff's counsel replied: "I
have." The court then said: "Anybody that is a stockholder in an indemnity
company raise your right hand." Defendant's counsel objected to "all this
proceeding before this jury" and asked to withdraw a juror, which motion was
denied. The court then said to the jury: "You are not to infer, gentlemen,
from anything you have heard here this afternoon in reference to indemnity
companies, that there is any indemnity company at all interested in this case.
The law permits that kind of questions to be put to jurors because it is thought
that sometimes jurors who have financial interests in companies insuring against
accidents or injuries have a bias in their minds in that class of cases, and so it
is thought proper that parties should know whether jurors are of that type of
mind, or their business is such that they might have a prejudice in that class of
cases." This was held reversible error, the Appellate Division saying; "But
the prejudice to the defendant is not to be found not so much in the question of
whether any jurors were interested in indemnity insurance companies but in the
suggestion conveyed to the jurors by the assertion of counsel for plaintiff that
he knew of corporations insuring doctors against malpractice; that the defendant was thus protected-that the burden of a verdict would fall upon a corporation rather than upon the individual who was before them-and this point was
not cleared up before the jury by the remarks of the court * * * This was
getting before the jury 'by suggestion and indirection' that which plaintiff's
counsel had no right to do, and in a close case of this character it cannot be
presumed that it did not have its influence upon the jury, and the instructions
of the court did not operate to relieve the plaintiff from the error") ; Davis v.
Saltser, 192 App. Div. 921, 183 N. Y. Supp. 108 (2d Dept. 1920) ("In the
interests of justice a new trial should be had. Counsel in examining a juror
who was in the insurance business remarked, 'Then you issue policies such as
this thing here,' which suggested that defendants had insurance protection");
Kent v. Lajotte, 103 Misc. 497, 170 N. Y. Supp. 545 (1918) (Plaintiff's counsel
in the examination of jurors, asked: "Is there any gentleman who owns any
stock of an accident insurance company?" Defendant's counsel then moved for
the withdrawal of a juror and a new panel of jurors. Plaintiff's counsel then
said: "I do not ask that question to lead the jurors to believe that the defendant
is insured in an accident insurance company. I have the right to ask it on general
grounds * * * I will concede on the record that this defendant is not insured and
there is no insurance company in this case." Again, in summing up, plaintiff's
counsel said: "I do not know whether the defendant carried any insurance
against accidents caused by his horse and wagon; but I do know that he is too
busy making money in his butcher business uptown on Fourteenth Street to take
the time to attend court or show any interest in this trial. If he did not carry
accident insurance he could have come here and testified that he had none. In
view of his refusal to come here, I now withdraw the concession that I made
earlier in the trial as to accident insurance." This was held improper, the court
saying: "This statement of counsel I think amounted practically to a statement
that defendant did carry accident insurance and constituted reversible error.
* * * The rule laid down * * * has not been changed by the amendment to the
Code in 1911 (now N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 452) authorizing certain questions
to the jurors in reference to their interest in accident insurance and casualty companies"; Lassig v. Barsky, 87 N. Y. Supp. 425 (1904) ("In view of the information conveyed by plaintiff's counsel to the jurors, under the guise of inquiring
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in that specific company.4 3 It is generally held, however, that questions referring to specific insurance companies are not improper in
themselves,4 4 unless counsel "overreaches the limit" and asks the question in such a way as to leave an innuendo that the defendant is insured. 45 Thus, in Dulbergerv. Gimbel Brothers,46 the court, in holdinto their qualifications, that the defendant was insured against loss in the event
of a recovery against him, and a repetition of this reprehensible practice in the
course of the cross-examination of one of defendant's witnesses, the judgment
should
be reversed and a new trial ordered").
43
Hoyt v. Davis Manufacturing Co., 112 App. Div. 755, 98 N. Y. Supp.
1031 (3d Dept. 1906) ; Note (1928) A. L. R. 1418, 1464.
44
New Aetna Portland Cement Co. v. Hatt, 231 Fed. 611 (C. C. A. 6th,
1916); Ex parte Woodward Iron Co., 212 Ala. 220, 102 So. 103 (1924) ; Pekin
Stave & Mfg. Co. v. Ramsey, 104 Ark. 1, 147 S. W. 83 (1912); Eldridge v.
Clark & H. Constr. Co., 75 Cal. App. 516, 243 Pac. 43 (1925); Tatarsky v.
Smith, 78 Colo. 491, 242 Pac. 43 (1925) ; Church v. Stoldt, 215 Mich. 469, 184
N. W. 469 (1921)_; Carlson v. Bernier, 169 Minn. 517, 211 N. W. 683 (1927) ;
Blair v. McCormak Construction Co., 123 App. Div. 30, 107 N. Y. Supp. 750
(2d Dept. 1907) (Plaintiff, while examining jurors, asked: "Are any of the
jurors officers or stockholders in the Travelers' Insurance Company?" Defendant's objection was sustained, and the court charged: "Gentlemen, counsel
seems to apprehend that mention of the Travelers' Insurance Company may in
some way prejudice your minds, and prejudice the defendant's case. Now, the
court charges you that has no bearing in this case whatever-any mention of an
insurance company should not have any influence in your minds at all, whether
the Travelers' Insurance or the Equitable Life Insurance Company, or any
other insurance company-no consequence whatever in this case; should not
influence you in the least, or any juror in the room." The court, however,
refused defendant's motion to discharge the panel. On appeal, held, no error.
The court said that a question relating to a specific insurance company was not
improper, at least where the jury is instructed that they are not to be influenced
by the question); Rincken v. Acker, 125 App. Div. 244, 109 N. Y. Supp. 125
(2d Dept. 1912) (Plaintiff's attorney in examining the jury, asked: "Are any
of you gentlemen insured in the Fidelity and Casualty Company?" The jurors
replied, "No." Counsel then asked: "Is any one of you interested in any way
in the Fidelity and Casualty Company?" The jurors again replied, "No." The
court held this was not improper, saying: "The form of the question did not
disclose to the proposed jurors that the Fidelity and Casualty Company was an
insurance company. * * * I confess I can see no valid distinction between a
question which embraces all insurance companies and one which refers to but
one, the greater includes the less; if in answer to the more general question a
juror should answer in the affirmative, no one would deny that the question
relating to the specific company would then be material; and if it may be asked
after an affirmative reply to the general question, why may not counsel go at
once to the specific?") ; Anderson v. Standard Plunger Elevator Co., 113 N. Y.
Supp. 593 (1908) (Plaintiff's counsel asked the jury: "Are any of these gentlemen interested or stockholders in the Travelers' Insurance Company?" Defendant moved for a mistrial, which motion was denied. This was affirmed, the
court saying: "In my opinion theie was no error committed in the denial of the
defendant's motion * * * but it is unnecessary to decide the point, because even
if the question was not strictly proper the matter was not referred to at any
later stage of the case, and I am satisfied that the jury were not influenced by
the incident, as the verdict was abundantly sustained by the evidence and was
for a small amount considering the extent of the injuries").
45 See Rincken v. Acker, 125 App. Div. 244, 109 N. Y. Supp. 125 (2d Dept.
1912) where the court distinguishes Hoyt v. Davis Manufacturing Co., 112
App. Div. 755, 98 N. Y. Supp. 1031 (3d Dept. 1906) where it was indicated that
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ing that the interrogation of a juror as to whether he was "interested
in the Pacific Coast Casualty Company" was permissible, said: "The
appellant contends that this being a statutory right must be strictly
construed as permitting simply a general question, and not a particular inquiry as to any specific casualty company. This seems to be a
very strained construction of the statute. The general provisions as
to challenge of jurors are intended to safeguard the litigant from any
possible interest or bias on the part of a juror, and the recent amendment to section 1180 of the Code [now N. Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 452]
must be deemed to have been enacted with this same purpose. General inquiry as to the jurors' interest in any casualty company having
already been properly made in this case, it is difficult to see how the
defendant could have been prejudiced by further inquiry as to a particular company. It would seem that the shield which has been
thrown around casualty companies is already ample, and that there
is no cause for extending the rule in that regard."
III. Conclusions.
The rule in New York concerning the admissibility of references
to the fact of the defendant's insurance is a rigid one. The use of the
questions relating to a specific insurance company was bad form, as follows:
"In that case, while examining the jurors as to their qualification, the plaintiff's
counsel asked the following question: 'Are you interested as agent or stockholder in any insurance company insuring corporations against liability for
negligence?' * * * The opinion of the court in the third department, which it
may be remarked was the opinion of a minority of the justices sitting, did not
undertake to decide whether the asking of such a question is legal error which
calls for the reversal of the judgment. The opinion criticised the conduct of
counsel in asking the question, and then said: 'but it should be understood that
such questions are dangerous, and when asked without good reason may be very
unprofitable to the party who asks them.' It was stated, however, that the
judgment should be reversed because the verdict was against the evidence and
was not fairly sustained by it. It is to be noted that the opinion distinctly says
that this question is not decided and also states that 'when counsel [asks] such
questions overreaching the limit; with a hope to gain a benefit from them, it is
but fair that he should take the risk, and in a close case the court may properly
consider that such suggestion had the very effect which counsel intended it
should have"'; Kolacki v. American Sugar Refining Co., 164 App. Div. 417,
150 N. Y. Supp. 93 (2d Dept. 1914) (Plaintiff's counsel asked the jurors if they
were interested in the Employers' Liability Insurance Company which is
"defending this case." The court held this reversible error, saying: "The fact
of a defense by the insurance company was thus pointedly injected into the trial
at its threshold. It had even less excuse than the instances where the disclosure
of such an interest by a casualty company came out in the course of the examination of a witness") ; Lipschultz v. Ross, 84"N. Y. Supp. 632 (1903) (Plaintiff's counsel, in examining a juror, asked whether any of the jury were interested
in the Travelers' Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn. Upon defendant's
objection, plaintiff's counsel said: "I want to see whether any of the jury are
connected with said insurance company. It now appears that one of the jurors
is an agent of this very company, and I understand that this case is being
defended by the Travelers' Insurance Company." This was held reversible
error).
4876 Misc. 225, 134 N. Y. Supp. 574 (1912).
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word "insurance" in a negligence action may in itself be ground for
the reversal of a judgment, and this notwithstanding that the jury has
been instructed to disregard such reference. 47 In the majority of the
cases where this rule was invoked, however, it was apparent that
counsel injected the irrelevant reference to insurance with the deliberate purpose of prejudicing the defendant. In such instances the
rule may be justified.4 8 But where wilfulness is absent, it would
seem that an instruction to the jury to disregard the statement is all
that the defendant is entitled to for the safeguardment of his rights.
To hold
otherwise is a direct reflection on the intelligence of our
49
jurors.

To summarize it may be said:
(1) As a general rule any reference in a negligence action that
the defendant is insured is improper; violation of the rule
where it appears that the defendant has been prejudiced
thereby, will result in a new trial in spite of the fact that
the jury has been instructed to disregard the reference;
(2) This rule does not exclude evidence of insurance where
such evidence is relevant upon any material controverted
fact;
(3) Evidence of insurance may be admissible where it forms
part of a competent admission;
(4) Evidence of insurance may be admissible to show bias and
interest of witnesses;
(5) Evidence of insurance may be admissible to show the interest of jurors; questions relating to specific insurance
companies are probably proper, providing they convey no
inference that the defendant is insured.
Louis

J.

GUSMANO.

DUTY OF RELATIVES TO SUPPORT DEPENDENTS.

I.

More and more the problem of support of dependents by relatives
has become recognized as a legal as well as a moral and social obliga47 See note 11, supra.

See notes 13, 14, mpra.
Shaier v. Broadway Improvement Co., 22 App. Div. 102, 47 N. Y. Supp.
815 (1st Dept. 1897) ("It would be a severe reflection upon the integrity and
intelligence of this jury for us to assume that because such a question was asked
they disregarded the sworn testimony of the witness, and, in violation of the
express direction of the court, assumed that the insurance company was interested in the case and allowed such an inference to affect their verdict").
48
49

